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INTRODUCTION
This is a report of a rather unusual undertaking. The general study
area of the management of science and technology contains a great
number of findings but few applications. Research executives find rather
little of general value in the reported literature. In an attempt to discover
an approach which would divert the post course of enquiry and to expand
the usefulness of present research, the authors convened a WORKSHOP
ON DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS. The following pages provide a report of this
workshop.
In the first section the verbatim typescript of the workshop is
summarized in chronological order. This is baseline data for the reader
as he reads into the following sections. Section II is an expansion of
the introductory paragraph to more clearly present the intent of the work-
shop and the hoped for value of the dimensional analysis approach. The
immediately following section presents the theoretical model of the research
and development process that served as the central theme of the workshop.
The fourth and final section presents an analysis of the workshop and a
tentative new model for further research.
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I. WORKSHOP ON DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS: SESSION SUMMARY
In early May, 1969 a group of twenty research and development execu-
tives from a wide variety of institutions gathered for a three day workshop.
What follows is a summary of the high points from this workshop. In the
opening session of the program the purpose was presented in a brief manner.
The purpose of the workshop is to gain a richer understanding
of those conditions which are appropriate for the use of certain
general management tools and those conditions which render these
tools inappropriate. Invariably the decisions of a research manager
are based on personal experience - and the experience of others.
How do managers bring this experience to bear in new situations?
What do they look at - what dimensions do they measure - to tell
them when their experience is applicable and when it isn't? What
are the key variables to this process of bringing experience from
one situation to bear upon another situation?
To accomplish this general purpose the workshop design was that of a
rather free flowing discussion from which the important understandings would
be abstracted at a later date. For this reason a verbatim report of the work-
shop was produced and this report is the basis of the following summary.
The first question put to the group was the overall question of whether
or not research can be managed. This was restated in a most important way
by a university laboratory research executive.
I think a fairly meaningful question might be when, and how,
and for what reason do you change the direction in which you
are going at any given time. Most of us inherit a project or
we have been on a project for a reasonable length of time -
and it is very tempting to continue along the road you know.
Then comes a time when you say, 'Is that the right thing to do?1
Here it was correctly pointed out that if a project went along in an un-
changing manner and met its initial objectives, then the question of can
research be managed becomes much less interesting. Thus the crucial question
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is the one dealing with decision-making in a changing situation. When,
how and on what bases are change decisions taken? Two general kinds
of pressures for change were mentioned:
1. Pressure for change arises when progress is slow and
interesting modifications become apparent.
2. Pressure for change arises when the development begins
to swing away from an area of value to the laboratory,
given its general objectives.
A research manager learns about the first pressure by simply pursuing the
project. The second pressure can be highlighted by specific management
action, or as one participant put it:
In the real world, the best decision on what to do
is made as soon as possible before you have any
more research done than you absolutely have to have.
This is a strong belief in judgment and the need to identify project
value in light of laboratory objectives early on. At this point a director
of an industrial chemical research group suggested five bases for making
decisions. Some of these bases could be used systematically and some
are rather random.
First of all, using the data that you have, there is the
analytical basis - it can be economic or technical,
scientific or ecological or what have you.
Secondly, there is the basis of experience - what you know
or what you have learned that you can document.
Thirdly, there is the basis of "gut feel" - the intuition
factor.
The fourth basis is politics. It's politic to make a decision
in a certain way. You can call it a frame of reference or
company policy but it gets down to politics.
The fifth basis is emotional. Joe's a good friend of yours; so
you throw the project his way. Usually you do this without
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realizing it.
The remainder of this introductory session focussed in one way or
another upon the relationship between research and the objectives of
whatever supra-organization the laboratory was embedded in. Here the
question faced was not the management of research projects, but it was
the management of research laboratories.
For instance, the following comment was made:
You get to the point where research can't be divided from
the total operation. In other words, the success of research
depends on the success of a lot of other parts of the
organization in carrying the thing through. If you have
a weak link in development or production or marketing the
research result can fall by the wayside. You can't look
at research and development out of context with the whole
organization. It is part and parcel of it, and its success
depends on how it can interact with the rest of the organ-
ization.
Thus one of the keys to research success seemed to be the value
the organization as a whole gains from the laboratory findings. This value
can only be gained if the organization is willing to use research results.
The participant continues by saying:
Sometimes it is very difficult to determine what the
management really wants because what they say and
what they really want sometimes are two different things.
It is only when they come up to the fence and they have
to make a hard decision that the truth comes out. The
research manager has to sense where his function fits
into the total organization and the full success depends on
how well he can sense the 'real objectives.'
At this point the meeting began to get heated as the classic tension
between science and business raised its head. Referring to an example
in which three research departments concurrently developed the same new
product - one refusing to market it, one unsuccessfully marketing it, and
one successfully marketed it: the following comment was made:
You think that research management success is measured
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by the ultimate profit to the company, whereas I
think a narrower definition is that the three research
organizations (above) all came up with a successful
development. Where it went from there is another story.
The rebuttal to this was:
I think the research manager in the company that decided
to drop it was wrong in carrying the development through
to the point of showing success. If he didn't know
enough about what his company wants, he is wasting
resources to carry it out.
Another twist to this argument then arose:
There is a frame of reference that the research man
must be very alert to, but, it is also the obligation
of the research man to help set the frame of reference.
Let us not assume that management is master and re-
search is subservient. Research has an obligation
to lead, just as management has an obligation to set
objectives.
The discussion then turned to the clarity of objectives with the
understanding that industrial organizations had clearer objectives than
basic government laboratories; but that even in industrial organizations
that part of their resources devoted to basic or speculative research
seemed to be as much at sea as the basic governmental laboratories.
Thus one dimension of project success is wrapped up with the clarity
of project objectives and the clarity of laboratory objectives.
It is becomming quite clear to this author from the verbatim
typescript if not from the summary that a major area of confusion in
the study field of research management is the relationship between
project success and laboratory success. This is further compounded by
the time dimension. Laboratory success is measured best over a period
of years, whereas project success is measured in the present. Referring
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to the typescript these comments are important to note. First:
It is highly useful for us, in certain areas, to
establish centers of excellence because that may
even on a standby basis be highly important for us
in order to maintain a competitive margin.
Then another participant:
On this center of excellence that you mentioned,
we established those about ten years ago and now
you can sell them to management because you can
point out the fruits of that research. For the first
years of these centers you didn't have this perfor-
mance data to sell management with.
These comments suggest the long term nature of the success
measure when applied to basic research (centers of excellence).
Now talking about development projects there is this comment of one
of the authors:
Part of the payoff from an unsuccessful project was
learning so that next time they started a development
program they were able to produce an order of magnitude
improvement over the previous system.
Thus project failure leads to laboratory success!
The following morning the group reconvened and agreed to look
at a particular case presented by the industrial chemical director.
One strong flavor of the incident presented was the need for the re-
search group to actively overcome corporation resistance to the market-
ing of the subject innovation. This was a good example of the earlier
comment about being unable to understand the real intent of management
until they had to make a hard decision. The ensuing discussion focussed
on the question of should research management be responsible to "sell"
their results to the corporation or should research management be res-
ponsible to pursue only the results which the corporation will buy without
-7-
any pressure from the research division.
Here the need to "sell" is presented with two justifications, one
from the point of view of the laboratory and one from the point of view
of the individual researcher.
A research group justifies its existence by getting its
product into the marketplace. I think that points out
getting it to the marketplace is not proof of how effective
the product is but how it is handled once it is innovated.
Continuing:
The other part is the need that everyone has, particularly
creative people, to achieve at the highest possible level,
and inherent in achievement here is commercialization.
Supported by an ethical drug executive:
I would agree - the idea is to develop something simply
to achieve. And until the dollars come back, what have
you done? You have only issued a couple of patents.
Thus it was argued that the "selling" of research results to the
corporation is a responsibility the research manager has, not from the
corporation, but toward the individual researcher. Here a contribution
from one participant added a specific management strategy which makes
the "sale" of research results quite a bit simpler.
As soon as we do identify a product concept that we are
interested in moving through to the marketplace, we set
up a steering committee composed of top management people
in the three functions that are involved (marketing, pro-
duction and R & D) and a project manager, and a task force.
This starts very early so that as the direction of the project
has to change the production and marketing men are part of
the decision. But, then, if you look at corporate research
which isn't tied to an operating division, the problem is al-
together different and much more complex because it is much
more difficult to create this sort of an operating team.
This statement which offers a technique for making the "selling"
job easier and for making the transfer from R & D to production to marketing
easier reinforces the concern about clarity of objectives. The inference is
that in divisional research a product team can easily be identified, while
in corporate research this is not so. The value of clear objectives in
estimating research success and enabling research management was not
universally accepted as the following interchange demonstrates. First a
food products director:
I think everyone in this room has a responsibility for the
pursuit with management of where they are going to go in
business. That has nothing to do with running the research
facility or defining objectives, but simply trying to get
your stuff sold.
A chemical executive:
Essentially, you are dealing with management by exception.
As long as what you are producing is being absorbed, you
are satisfied. If for one reason or another, the flow of your
products to top management stops, or it is not being accepted
adequately, then you have to do something - something unusual,
at times.
The rejoinder:
I think you have to be sure that they have an understanding
of what it is you are getting them into at an early stage.
If you start them when you start and then keep playing to
them, when the new product comes, it is not a surprise.
In understanding the reasons for needing to "sell" research results and
some of the problems attendant to this, a quite important new twist was
added to the discussion by a commercial electronics executive. His
comment was directed to the core example under discussion.
The product division managers accepted fully - that here is
a radical new process with a marvelous market, but there is
a big risk factor. These managers have to measure the risk
against their profits this quarter, this fiscal year, and over
the immediate future. If the divisional managers go into
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something long term, where profits aren't going to come up
for a long period of time, they are not likely to be charitably
measured in the present. So, on the scale of values of the
product division manager, which is heavily influenced by
the feedback and measurement system of the corporation, it
is quite understandable that a long term project wouldn't be
very interesting.
Thus the standard accounting procedures of most corporations is a
demotivator in regard to accepting long term risk and this present orientation
causes a major tension between research and operations. Minor product
improvements will flow easily from research to production but major
improvements, new products or breakthroughs meet a resistance which is
intensified over and above the inherent risk by the financial control system
used to measure the operating division. Later he returned to this subject
at some length.
I was thinking about this in our discussions last night, the
very significant importance of the way the accountants - we
sometimes call them the bean counters - arrange to put the
beans. Its feedback effect on people, I think, is intensely
critical. That is why I responded earlier to be charitable to
the product division manager who might be measured on a short
term basis. He does not have time to look far beyond. Under
those conditions a central research function regardless of how
glorious or productive it might be isn't likely to easily gain
acceptance for its new products or new knowledge. But often
the accounting person without perhaps too much experience may
set up structures which the research organization is forced to
fit within. The feedback loops are established and a major impact
is felt on research effectiveness.
Still trying to grapple with the problem of selling the result of research
to the rest of the organization, a new task was tried. In this new task
several areas of uncertainty were identified. The original ideas of the authors
about need or target uncertainty and the technical certainty was expanded
by pointing out areas of resistance to the use of research results.
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I think about five different factors. One is technology;
another is manufacturing capability; another is marketing
capability - not just capability, but existence in the
market of known activity; another is financial structure;
and another is management.
When looking at potential new products or new knowledge that
might go into a product one must be aware that if more than
one of the above concerns are new, then the barriers toward
getting it through and being a profitable product for the
corportation are extremely high.
Uncertainties that come from lack of experience can lead to many
barriers to innovation. For instance, an electronic company of this
author's experience considering going into leased computer peripheral
equipment faced a market which they had never explored (industrial rather
than government), a financial structure they were unfamiliar with (leasing
rather than sales), a new technology (computer logic for ground-based
equipment rather than airborne), manufacturing processes that required
competitive approaches (low unit cost) rather than aerospace methods (high
unit cost), and a new management team to head up the project. On all
five counts they were in trouble according to the criterion posed above.
They succeeded in selling only one systems worth of peripheral equipment
at a great loss to the corporation and a great deal of embarrassment.
After a brief recess, in which three main groups tried to see when it
was a research manager had to "stand up and be counted," the group began
to wander. One of the criteria of importance that developed from this
wandering is related to the organizational relationship between the research
laboratory and the set of people who represent the user. Sometimes this set
is marketing. Three general types were suggested. The first type of
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organizational relationship is one in which the research laboratory has all
the information upon which the project selection decision is made.
Two examples of this were represented at the workshop. In one,
marketing research was part of the research division, and there were no
organizational members outside research who had good information in order
to second guess. In the other, the laboratory was dealing in such advanced
research that they played the role of adviser to the customer (government)
as well as researcher. The second type of organization is typified by
a company in an old technology. Here research and operations have worked
together for so long in a slowly changing technology and market that dis-
agreement is rare. The third type is typified by the normal government
contracter. There the customer is a very complex, sometimes uncoordinated,
government. Clarity and agreement is often tenuous and mercurial.
Following the luncheon recess the remainder of the small groups reported
to the session. Another aspect of the feedback problem presented earlier
was brought up.
I think one reason your chief executive doesn't place the
R and D man in a top management role is that by the time
a product becomes a success and has generated a big pile
of profit the chief executive associates its success with the
marketing organization. There are very few who ever think
back to the origin of the product. The top guy would rather
look at something existing, something big with a lot of volume
and profit. When I say can you remember this product when
it was a prototype on the bench, he can't quite remember that.
He just remembers that now it is a very successful business.
Then when I say I can remember when it was a prototype on
the bench and now I am showing you another prototype which
I think has the same potential, he looks at you kind of funny
and gives you this permissive, lYes,but l.
One of the inherent difficulties of managers involved in R and D is
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the extensive time horizon between their work and noticeable value to
the organization. Since executive mobility in any one role is so short,
two to five years on average, very few executives have from personal
experience seen research pay off. Thus the manager must invest in the
future, knowing that the risk he takes even if right will not be to his
personal benefit as he will have moved on to a new role before the
investment begins to pay off.
Here the conference turned to the presentation of a paper entitled
"A Speculative Framework for the Analysis of Research and Development".
This paper itself is presented intact in the third section of this summary.
To relieve the reader from immediately referring to the "Speculative
Framework", a small section of the model is summarized below. It is
this section which served as the focus of much of the ensuing discussion,
TECHNOLOGY NEEDS VALUE
I
GESTALT SYNTHESIS
FORMALIZED TARGET
i
DISSONANCE ESTIMATE
A Gestalt synthesis is said to occur when a researcher on a research
organization can initially perceive how a combination of technology might
satisfy a need or set of needs that are valued by some group of users .
Over time the synthesis becomes clearer and finally it approximates the
reality of the new product or service or process. A formalized target is
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an attempt to spell out the synthesis (idea) so that others can help to
work on it. In early days it is called a line of research, later a
specification and finally a drawing set. A dissonance estimate is the
researching part of the organization trying to estimate whether it can
successfully invent or develop the line of research or product as
represented by the formal target. As the research itself is pursued the
dissonance estimate becomes sharper and the organization can more
closely specify the differences between the possible and the target. This
estimate or evaluation often serves to alter the synthesis or idea and
eventually to alter the target. The full model bears inspection but is
not needed in order to detail the workshop reaction to the delivery of the
"Speculative Framework".
The group struggled with the "speculative framework" for quite a while.
They needed to understand some of the unfamiliar words used in the model
and to see if it fit different situations. To some, the model appeared to
be useful for development of systems but not component development. To
some, the model applied to product research not basic research. To some
it seemed to have universal applicability as indeed the authors had hoped.
One criticism that was dead on is reported here.
"It seems to me that this model takes it from the top down. I
perceive you think perhaps that a research manager or somebody
up in the top of the organization gets these wonderful Gestalt
Syntheses, and he perceives in his infinite wisdom what should
be done, gets it done, gets the feedback and manipulates the
whole thing to the project. How about the case when the
Gestalt Synthesis comes up from the bottom? Have you looked
at that? In our laboratory this happens very, very often. The
idea comes from way, way down".
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A further well taken criticism of the model was offered by another
participant:
"One concept you used - when you went from "formalized target"
to "dissonance estimate" does not appear to be valid way to
think about research. You infer the flow from "synthesis" to
"target" to "dissonance estimate" is down the hierarchy and done
sequentially. Those three things always have to be done by
a closely-knit team of people. Normally in a big project you
get 20 guys together, and they churn up and down the hall and
scratch on each other's blackboard, and later certain things
become obviously ridiculous and certain things aren't. Never
do you hand a "formalized target" to another outfit who looks at
it, does a "dissonance estimate" and then feeds it back to
the Gestalters. It is always one group. In the first step you
don't have formalized targets - you have parametric traits. You
go through this thing parametrically, not freezing it too fast.
It is sort of a big change as you are organizing chaos. Then
you get to the preliminary design phase, after which the concept
of formal target can be divorced from the concept of "dissonance
estimate" (evaluation) and from that of doing the research itself".
The remainder of the session was devoted to the value of structural problem
analysis and structured decision analysis, which is a way of making good
decisions on limited information. The Kepner-Tregoe methodology was highly
recommended with examples of its value. The specifics of the technique
were not discussed. At this point the session adjourned for the evening
recess.
In the morning a case was raised that involved the closure of a major
laboratory and the transfer of some of its programs to other laboratories. Some
of the personnel from the closed facility also were transferred, but the majority
were detached. This laboratory had been operated on a contract basis and
part of the closure decision turned around the need for an in-house capability
in this field rather than the dependency on an external laboratory, even
though it was under contract. In the discussion of this decision several
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points were raised. The closed laboratory was involved in basic research
and applications which were believed to be many years away from field use.
Thus it was known that the transition period from external laboratory to
internal laboratory would delay progress by two or three years, but the
impact of this delay was impossible to estimate. This delay was to be
tolerated in the light of an overriding policy to have positive control over
research areas such that future heavy pressures would not be able to interfere
with the response capability of the organization. Another point of this
decision is the nature of consultation. The decision was taken with only
a few members of the organization participation. The financial information
relating to the decision was easily available, but the rest of the decision
parameters were purely judgemental and the decision itself was,in a sense,
considerably political. The decision was taken at a level in the organization
where the judgement could best be made. It was taken at the first level
that encompassed all the research units which were relevant to the organ-
izational strategy relating to the value of in-house capability.
The wrap-up of this particular discussion raised the issue of research
organization survival. Some organizations of the size of the closed lab-
oratory would say that there is a lot of value to the continuance of our
working together. Somehow we reinforce one another and we have reached a
"critical mass" that makes our organization as a whole greater than the sum
of its parts. Other organizations would not feel this way and each of its
components would drift into new association. In this latter case the cross-
stimulation between components has not been very high, and each component
is relatively independent. In such a case the organization exists only as an
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umbrella to handle administrative problems and not much else. The
question raised but unanswered in the discussion is 'What conditions
create critical mass or interdependence such that organizational survival
becomes an important issue1.
The remainder of the workshop was devoted to evaluating the sessions
and concluding how a future workshop might be made better. This concludes
the summary of the typescript. The section following this presents an
analysis of the workshop intent and the results of the dimensional analysis
approach.
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II. WHY A WORKSHOP ON DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS ?
The stimulus for the workshop was the rather widespread agreement
that much of our shared knowledge about the management of research has
limited generality. The weekend focused on one important premise-
The ability to usefully share knowledge about research
management has been limited by the lack of explicit
identification of important conditional dimensions.
Most reported experience has implicit limitations to the understanding of
its general usefulness - limitations which are due to overly simplified
descriptions of the conditions surrounding the experience being discussed.
For instance, results are often reported thusly:
1. It was found that creativity was stimulated when controls
were relaxed. (Data is from seven pharmaceutical laboratories.)
2. Project management forms of organization cause an increase
in voluntary termination. (Data from six aerospace corporations
over a three-year period.)
The objective of the workshop was to overcome such sparsity of description
and to develop a rich set of project and environmental descriptors or
"conditional dimensions ".
Evidence shows that good research managers do, in fact, manage research
such that there is a directive correlation between what they do and the
outcomes that they desire. A good manager is richly connected with the
feel of the institution and the people with which he deals, and this rich
A directive correlation implies a purposive causal relationship between
action and desired effect.
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connection allows him to make decisions based on a great number of
variables only a few of which are ever systematically articulated. In
a large sense this is why length of experience pays off so handsomely
in the field of research management. In essence this is saying that a
good manager really does understand what he is doing, at least in the sense
of his intuitative grasp of the process and of the hueristic or rule-of-thumb
rules which seem to work within this specific context.
The difficulty then lies in the ability of a particular good manager to
share this knowledge with people with whom he has very limited contact.
Within his own staff he shares this knowledge by constant example and
action, discussion, bull sessions, and the like. External to his organization -
and by external I mean upward to the corporate level as well as outward to
the research community in general - he has an extremely difficult task in
describing what really went on in his own mind when certain types of decisions
were taken.
The writer or speaker in the field of research management tends to report
what may be termed conventional wisdom about the management of research.
He knows what he does. He would like to tell other people what he does,
but he has a little trouble imagining the context in which they might apply
what he has to say and as a result of both time presures and limited
capability to interact, the presentation focuses on one or two points which
were developed in a very limited setting and the richness of the experience
goes by the boards.
The problem that stands out now is the method of arriving at a set of
dimensions. There seem to be three fairly interesting techniques which might
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be used for such a task. In almost all cases, these techniques lean
heavily on some form of disagreement. "It is when I explore why you
disagree with me that we begin to see what are the dimensions of the
problem over which we have this disagreement." In effect, it is often
disagreement as to what the problem is that makes it so hard for individuals
to agree on the solution.
One device is to have a general problem presented in a strange lan-
guage, in other words to take away from the researchers and the people
discussing the problem the stereotypes up which they lean for everyday
communication. It is important to describe the situation in unusual words,
words that stick in the mind which are not comprehended by the twinkle of
an eye. From this point the discussion of a particular problem, once stated
in this new language, tends to be around the elaboration of what do you
consider a particular word to connote, what does it mean, and is it the
understanding of what you mean by that word and what J. mean by that word
and what somebody else means by that word that begins to reveal the
dimensions upon which the group has worked for a long time but never
articulated.
A second technique involves the construction of an idealized model of
the problem, the line of research for instance or the development objective.
This idealized model is then placed before a number of relevant people who
must contribute to the realization of this model. In the interchange back and
forth among these relevant members over the possibility of realizing this
ideal, they begin to understand what kinds of hidden unarticulated dimensions
are of importance. To use an example from a large development effort, a
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number of companies, when they begin a development effort, take the
managers from all the related functional areas off site for a two or three
day conference. In this setting they hammer out the basic problems of
execution in this particular project. Here they find out from the manufacturing
man that when this project is scheduled to be released to production, there
would be a production capacity restraint, but he will be able to handle it
if it slips six months or is available three months earlier. It is these kinds
of understandings or other kinds of parameters that really make the difference
between the way you manage this particular project versus any other.
There is a third technique for developing dimensions and this seems to
be the technique most relevant to the development of a so-called dimensional
analysis for research and development broadly conceived. This is a technique
of focusing on a particular set of issues and bringing a heterogeneous set
of research managers together. The concept here is that a particular critical
managerial intervention by one man in one setting may be viewed by other
men as being irrelevant or it doesn't seem that it would really cause the
effect that the man claims. Seasoned researchers would question other
seasoned researchers to articulate a little more fully as to just exactly what
was going on that made that particular managerial intervention a success or
perhaps a failure. It is crucial to understand why a particular Intervention
in a particular setting does work and does not seem applicable in some other
setting. It is these kinds of understandings that lead to a more explicit
listing of dimensions that seem to be relevant to the comprehension and
sharing of research management knowledge.
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It is this particular approach that the workshop employed to explore
the dimensions of Research and Development. A transcript of all comments
made by the participants provided a record of the workshop and subject
material for post workshop analysis. Unfortunately, in the dynamics of
small group discussions it was not possible to directly explicate as rich
a set of dimensions as anticipated, although much sharing of insight occurred
in these sessions. An analysis of the transcripts does however provide new
information about important dimensions.
From a preliminary point of view the theoretical model presented on
the second day seemed to continue to hold some promise. Analysis of the
other data developed dimensions that were not accounted for in the model.
The immediately next section of the report presents that theoretical model while
the later sections of the report focus on the post workshop data analysis and
the conclusions regarding dimensionality.
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III. A SPECULATIVE FRA1-IEWORK FOR
THE ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH A]fl? DEVELOPMENT
Introduction ' '
Like all executives, the research and development executive is basically an
"action taker". He takes action in a situation frought with uncertainty and compli-
2
cated by the unusual behavioral characteristics of his staff. He is faced with a
broad assortment of issues upon which he must take action in order to move his
organization forward. These issues involve his organization's ability to develop
relevant technical capabilities and a continuing stream of progress in the long-run
as well as his organization's ability to execute present projects and allocate present
resources in the short-run. The nub of the executive's problem seems to revolve
around the interaction of uncertainty and behavior and the trade-off between long-run
and short-run. The speculative framework presented herein presents a set of
dimensional questions which focuses on this critical issue.
This paper explicitly deals with design, development and research (DD&R).
At a specific level there are many differences between the various activities that are
characterized as design or development or research; but, the different types of DD&R
hold in common the central theme of purposeful learning and the application of this
learning. This paper intentionally focuses on the common dimensions of such activities.
It offers a framework that is aimed at usefulness for discussion, comparative analysis
and improved understanding among those who must manage DD&R activities. The
2
Highly educated, creative, independent, oriented to personal growth, resistant
to structure, etc.
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payoff from such a common framework is an ability to selectively use knowledge
which others have acquired about the management of these activities.
Several common elements pervade all DD&R tasks. One set of such elements
can be grouped under the heading of "sensing the developments external to the
organization." The organization must be informed about technical or scientific
possibilities (i .e. the state-of-the-art), the sort of results that are needed and the
changing value of those needs.
In order to assess technical possibilities the organization must find ways of
keeping abreast of new technical knowledge being developed in the scientific and
technical community. This involves many diverse forms of information acquisition.
This diversity arises from the diversity in the sources of information, the diversity
in the methods be which the organization digests the information and, of course,
whether the information is needed for a present problem or to increase the organization's
basic store of knowledge. Such knowledge includes the question of what is our
present state of knowledge about matrix isolation, full cell development, or ESP,
for instance. A similar question is what is our likely future knowledge about these
research areas in the short-term and in the long-term.
The organization must also sense the technical needs toward which it might be
able to make a contribution. Such needs include contributions to basic knowledge as
well as applications of basic knowledge. This, also, involves the use of diverse
information acquisition methods. For example, will increasing pollution or decreasing
fossil fuel supply present new demands requiring solutions arising from some combination
of DD&R activity?
Interestingly, the relative prioity of needs continues to shift as the underlying
value structure in society shifts. For instance, the advent of urban rioting in the
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mid-sixties has seem to trigger a number of diverse shifts in emphasis within the
research community. There has been some increasing interest in the "ruin
problem" in actuarial mathematics due to the increasing size of insurance losses.
Similarly, an increased emphasis on riot control has led to the development of
technical devices to aid law enforcement departments. Whereas, a different thrust
of concern, that of riot prevention, has stimulated interdisciplinary social science
research. Relative need priorities are, also, affected by organizational value changes.
Diversification, for instance, tends to broaden the range of applicable basic research
while at the same time requiring more specialized applied research. The decision to
emphasize mission oriented research and to lessen the resource allocation to central
research is a reflection of a changing organizational value system.
Aside from the sensing of input an organization must, also, have a way of putting
them together — of connecting technological possibilities with needs. This process
may generate the understanding of a potential theoretical breakthrough, or a possible
innovational product, or a major improvement in the present way of doing things. The
coupling of need and potential is crucial to the successful DD&R establishment . With
the above as prologue this paper now describes a conceptual framework for analysis.
The Conceptual Diagram
The conceptual diagram presented here is a schematic version of our present
3
focus regarding the research and development process. It is presented in a rather
simplified form for the sake of clarity. The diagram is the contextual setting for the
following detailed description.
3Although our framework is considerably different from that of Roberts in his
The Dynamics of Research and Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), we
do subscribe to the process theory of research and development.
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Briefly the diagram depicts an environment which is coupled to the research
and development process by three sensing systems. The sensors obtain information
regarding 1) the present scientific and technological state-of-the-art, 2) needs, both
external and internal, and 3) values from society at large and from the organization
itself. The information is combined into a gestalt synthesis which recognizes that
a particular conbination of the sensed technology will probably meet some of the
sensed needs in a manner which is consistent with the sensed values. This gestalt
synthesis is then transformed into a formalized target (e.g. a line of investigation for
basic research or a specification for a product improvement).
To continue, the formalized target becomes an input to the next stage in the
process of research and development. The initial step in this stage is the construction
of a dissonance estimate, that is, an evaluation of whether the target can be
achieved. The estimate includes cost and schedule as well as the performance
envelope. This dissonance estimate is then fed back to the gestalt synthesis.
After the initial evaluation has been made a division of effort occurs among the
individuals and/or groups of the research project/team. The individual groups now
perform their own dissonance estimate and feed it back to the top level management.
The research groups then engage in the process of reducing to practice the part of
the problem assigned to them with periodic and/or continuous feedback vis-a-vis
their current progress and their current dissonance estimate.
The following sections of this paper will concentrate on an elaboration of
each step in the process. Emphasis will be placed on a description of the nature
and the dynamics of each step in the process.
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Value Sensing
The value system plays an important role in sensitizing an organization to
other inputs. Because of this, the values held by the individuals and the groups
which determine the overall objectives of an organization are an important
conditional variable in the research and development process. The traditional,
professional value system of scientists — the quest for "pure" knowledge — is
becoming laden with a sense of social consciousness.
The value systems of many large aerospace or systems corporations have
recently gone through a phase of significant change. Social problems are now
included on the menu of needs considered as possible targets. This shift in
values has caused a secondary shift in their traditional information couples with
answer producing sciences. For example, behavioral sciences are now included
where only physical or natural sciences may have been previously considered
relevant.
Major policies and actions are formed in such a way as to satisfy the preferences
of those who are important to the organization's continuation. Cyert and March
have conceptualized organizations as viable coalitions which determine their
objectives by negotiation among the members of the coalition. The organization's
value system then changes by changing the preferences of individual members or
by changing-the membership of the organization. This first process is relatively
5
slow. The second process is relatively constant with a complete change in
R. M. Cyert and J. G. March, "A Behavioral Theory of Organizational
Objectives" in Modern Organizational Theory, Mason Haire, ed., (New York:
Wiley, 1959).
5 This is inferentially derivable from the work of E. H, Schein, I. Scheiner
and C. A. Baker, Coercive Persuasion (New York; Norton, 1961).
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membership estimated at 10 year intervals. As presently conceived, the value
system of the organizational coalition changes relatively slowly but is subject to
exogenous events such as urban disorders and other seemingly remote considerations,
Need Sensing
The need sensor is crudely coupled to the environment and provides a list of
needs of the relevant society and estimates of the benefits of these needs. The
list of needs that are consciously or even subconsciously available to a research
organization is very incomplete when compared to total societal needs. The major
area of need sensing of organizational concentration is somewhat determined by
the organization's conception of what "business" it is in. The need sensing
mechanism is traditionally considered to include marketing research, long range
planning and technological forecasting. As such it is done by many members of
the organization who have widely varying positions and influence. The accuracy and
effectiveness of sensing need and estimating their benefits require abilities which'
are in existence in a broad range in the economy. The Du Pont organization seems
extremely able to do this whereas the Studebaker Corporation seems less effective.
6 Unpublished data of Richard Alan Goodman
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The dynamics of needs sensing are of several modes:
NEEDS MODE A
TIME
Mode A is a continuous process best characterized by the Volkswagen
Corporation's steady and continual improvement of the product. This might be
characterized as a continual tension between the research department and constantly
changing needs.
NEEDS MODE B
TIME
Mode B is a large discontinuity caused by a major environment change (or
the sudden recognition of such a change that itself may have occurred slowly).
This can be exemplified by Pearl Harbor or the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee on
the Urban Crises by the UCLA Graduate School of Business Administration.
NEEDS MODE C
TIME
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Mode C is a continual step increase in nood awareness which comos from a
continuous questioning of the environment.
There is no necessity for any organization to exhibit all the above modes, but
it is hypothesized that large organizations probably do. The style and rapidity of
need sensing has a distinctive impact upon the research and development process.
Technology Sensing
Technology sensing is a classic and obvious problem facing all decision makers
in the R & D environment. Recently, under the sibboleth of technology transfer,
interest has been focused more intensively on the problem of achieving an effective
couple between those generating technical and scientific knowledge and the potential
users of this knowledge.
The organization must design its technology sensing capability, its window
into technology, to satisfy several criteria, frequently needed technical information
must be available within the organization, the individuals who hold this information
must keep their store of knowledge fresh, and efficient means of identifying those
who are knowledgeable in new problem areas must be established. The organization
must filter against irrelevance but guard against obsolesance.
Emerging results from studies of innovation suggests that in most instances it
is the recognition of needs or better articulation of prior needs that usually stimulates
innovations. This was the pattern revealed by a study of 550 breakthroughs in DOD
•j
weapon systems and a similar pattern prevails in Sumner Myers1 study of 2 ,000
7C. W. Sherwin and R. Isenson, Project Hindsight .
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commercial innovations.8 The implications of this pattern makes the task of
management more difficult. The relevant solution technology or science will be
defined by the need (or problem) which is being addressed. The manager will
consequently find that he must anticipate and change the organizations menu of
available knowledge as areas of application are changed (i.e., market specialization).
Some organizations have taken the approach of defining an area of interest by
technology. This eases the problem of technology sensing but leads to more serious
problems. Such was the case with Western Union at the turn of the century. This
company envisioned telegraphy as its specialty, but the advent of new communication
9
technologies soon gave AT&T the dominant role.
The ambitious organization must be willing to change and adjust its information
sensing capabilities. The degree of change will be influenced by its policies of
entering new use areas, but even with a relatively stable use area some change is
essential if Schumpeter's gale of technological change^is not to destroy the organ-
ization. Even in a static environment the problem of coupling and sending is a
difficult one, and one that has technical as well as behavioral implications. The
most predominant role of effective transfer has been noted to be a people-to-people
one, within as well as without the organization. The manager must be concerned with
establishing effective people-to-people paths within a firm, change these as required,
or better still, create an environment in which they will change themselves.
8 Summer Myers, Unpublished data.
9 W. R. Maclaurin "The Process of Technological Innovation" in James
Bright, ed., Research Development and Technological Innovation (Homewood,
Illinois: Irwin 1964).
1® Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy (New York: Harper
& Row, 1950).
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Gestalt Synthesis
In this part of the process the organization conceptually juxtaposes the needs,
the benefits of satisfying these needs, the technological possibilities and their implied
cost and the extent value system. All are required, but any one or two may be latent
in an organization, with the innovative spark being provided by the addition of the
third element. With varying levels of clarity and creativity a gestalt synthesis envisions
the combination of several technological possibliities which will produce an outcome
that satisfies one or more needs either partially or completely. The synthesis also
includes a conceptualization of the process by which the technology can be combined
to produce the desired outcome, and therefore, the cost and time as well as the
technical implications of the envisioned process.
For any one project or line of investigation the gestalt synthesis continues to
change over time due to changes in the three inputs and the characteristics of feedback
to the synthesis. The need, value and technology information which determine the
original gestalt synthesis continue to change. The output of the actual research and
development process provides feedback which increases the understanding of what
really can be accomplished by the proper combination of technology and resources.
As the research and development proceeds, it tends to clarify an originally fuzzy
synthesis as more and more real pieces of the outcome come into existence.
The idea providing innovative spark required to form a gestalt synthesis and
the effectiveness with which it is elaborated can be affected by organization form
(Lorsch and Lawrence)^as well as organizational climate. A significant change along
11
 Jay Lorsch and Paul Lawrence, "Organizing for Product Innovation", Harvard
Business Review , January - February, 1965.
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the input or feedback links to the gestalt synthesis will cause changes. One of the
significant characteristics of the feedback process is the fact that an outcome which
matches the formalized target may not in fact match the gestalt synthesis. This usually
triggers a change in the synthesis or the target.
Formalized Targets
As a particular project progresses a more formal articulation of the gestalt
synthesis is required. This articulation, called the formal target, Is necessary for
communication of the idea from the synthesizing organizational unit to other units
which are to help bring this idea to fruition. The formalized target can assume any
form from a one paragraph statement of project purpose or a pencil sketch to a 500
page detailed specification. In general the target becomes more detailed and specific
over time.
It is important to realize that the target is only a surrogate measure of the
gestalt synthesis and when taken by itself often does not communicate the full intent
of the synthesis. In this light, an initial and continuing problem with the target is
how well it communicates the intent of the synthesis. Further, the target has some form
of dynamic response to the changing synthesis. This can be varied from a real time
response to a lagged response of various dimensions to no response.
As development progresses, the characteristic trend toward greater detail,
documentary proliferation, and specificity in the formalized target is an adaptive response
to complementing changes in the program. The number of individuals involved in the
program increases, as does increased tasks/specialization on their part and a requisite
need for communication and control. The task must be factored into work packages which
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are consistent with the specialized skill and knowledge that must be brought to bear
in completing various elements of a program. The target must also be factored in a
similar way to provide for the communication of objectives and goals for subtasks.
The factored targets take the form of subcontracts, purchase orders, specifications,
etc.
While formalized targets serve the purpose of communication, they also serve
other needs, as points of reference for control and as tangible evidence and milestones
for analytical and design progress. The process of elaborating the formalized target
is largely paced by the need for communication and control. As more resources are
added, subgroups designated, etc. , there is a corresponding exigent need to provide
targets for such subgroups.
A major function of management is to control decision making and resource
programs to insure that target elaboration does not proceed the gathering of relevant
knowledge. If the process of specifying and elaborating targets exceeds the
available knowledge level, the sub target elements may deviate significantly from
the choices which would otherwise have been selected.
Researcher Estimate of Process Outcome (Dissonance)
The formalized target is transmitted to a research and development organizational
unit for reduction to practice. Upon receipt of the formalized target and with some
communications with the gestalt synthesizing function, the research and development
chief begins to expand an initial appreciation of the proposed project using techinques
such as critical experiment control, systems analysis, PERT, simulative modeling,
technological forecasting, operations research and the like. He estimates the
possibility of producing an outcome which will satisfy the requirements of the
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formalized target. The estimate, obviously containing some degree of uncertainty,
provides the R&D chief with a notion of the dissonance between expected outcome
and the previously articulated target requirements.
During the estimating period those involved may be in frequent communication
with those directly making up the gestalt synthesis function trying to establish more
complete articulation and understanding of what is wanted. This is an attempt to
develop a shared cognitive mapping of the project. Varying techniques are used which
improves or degrades the ability of various units in an R&D organization to develop
an accurate shared cognitive map. The formality of the multiple bid technique, in which
an early specifications sent to a number of bidders, leads to a poorer shared mapping
than a more people-to-people process. For instance, project IHAS (Integrated
Helicopter Avionic System) drew from one company a proposal for a tightly integrated
multi-purpose radar subsystem, whereas the cognitive map held by the customer,
envisioned a number of separate radar functions all using a single computer. The
company's proposal was considered non-responsive, even though the company thought
it was reacting to the customer request. Conversely, the often recommended technique
of working with the customer's engineers closely during their search for a gestalt
synthesis often leads to a clearer and more faithful mapping between parties. Robert's
work shows that this appears to be the most effective technique for success in
dealing with the government.
The estimate of the dissonance between the target and the expected outcome,
as they both evolve over time, is continually changing as a result of changing input
about the target. This may come about as the target per se changes or as the target
becomes elaborated. The dissonance estimate, also, changes due to feedback
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concernlng emerging outcomes or Information concerning likoly outcomes from lower
participants in the research and development process.
Feedback to Gestalt Synthesis
As a result of the dissonance estimate,the research and development chief then
faces the decision as to what, how much, how often, and by what medium should the
dissonance estimate be fed back to the gestalt function. Robert's simulation of the
R&D process suggests that the higher the integrity of the R&D chief the more likely
the expectation of a fruitful outcome. Contrary to this is the implication of Dubin's
works,12 which suggests that real time information may overload the channel and cause
a breakdown in understanding. This suggests that the "more information the better"
is not the best answer. That is, a policy of integrity smoothed over time may be a
more appropriate feedback strategy.
Another phenomena relating to the feedback questions comes from the ambiguity
inherent in the early targets and the poor understanding and/or ambiguity related to an
early estimate of the outcome. A major dissonance is not perceptually admitted until
the outcome begins to shape up to reality (e.g., until a breadboard model falls far
short of desired performance).
A related feedback strategy is what information should be requested and/or
furnished to develop an appreciation of the dissonance estimate. Remembering that
the formalized target is only a surrogate measure of the gestalt synthesis, one can
12 Robert Dubin, "Stability of Human Organizations" in Mason Haire, ed. ,
Modern Organizational Theory ( New York: Wiley, 1959).
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easily see that a reporting and/or control system must necessarily be only a surrogate
measure of a surrogate measure. This is compounded by the problem that any estimate
of where you are in the R&D process is highly uncertain and due to the nature of
innovation, it is hard to find measures of how far ther is to go.
The feedback of a dissonance report also, has implications for continuing support
of the research and development unit. Thus, a strategy that is related to organizational
viability is usually considered to avoid either early termination of a project or the
development of competing approaches.
Division of Effort
The research and development chief must divide the effort required among the
various, relevant, organizational sub-units (sub-units can be individual researchers
or laboratories, etc.). One possible general methodology for establishing a division
of effort is clearly spelled out by Koontz and O'Donnell. Their solution of assigning
authority and responsibility to larger independent units, though, is often frustrated in
R&D by the inability to conceive of blocs of effort or tasks which are sufficiently
independent. Hall13 suggests that the principles applicable to such a division of
effort is to either minimize the number of interfaces between the sub-tasks or to
maximize the predictability of interfaces which are chosen — to select interfaces which
are well understood and have a low variability associated with them (Perrow14agrees
basically with this). For a research problem, this involves complete independence,
perhaps.
13A. Hall, A Methodology for Systems Engineering (New York: VanNostrand, 1960).
^ Charles Perrow, "A Framework for Comparative Analysis of Organization",
American Sociological Review, April, 1967.
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Concurrently with the problem of appropriately dividing the task is the
problem of maintaining a useful interrelationship and communication system between
tho sub-tasks. These bring to the fore problems of organizational behavior. Each
organizational sub-unit will perceive its own character and behave in a way functional
to its own preservation. This will add to the inherent technological difficulties, pure
organizational conflicts. The management of system trade-off will be contaminated
with the need to manage organizational trade-offs.
Subdivision Dissonance Estimate
The research and development unit 's various subdivision receive sub-targets as
their work statements. The sub-unit chief compiles a dissonance estimate in the same
fashion as the research and development chief does. This dissonance estimate has one
particular new dimension and that is interdependency. The sub-unit chief must, also,
develop information regarding the dissonance estimates of other sub-units and their
impact upon his estimate.
Ideally, continuing information on the dissonance estimate may be available
through the control system. The effect of a control system, however, is to inhibit
a rich d issonance estimate by requiring the presentation of information upward in a
specific way. The merging of information systems with control purposes tends to turn
the dissonance estimator's attention to the surrogate measures inherent in the control
system rather than to the search for relevant cues from the process.
The process described above relates to the feedback to the gestalt synthesizer.
Part of this feedback is formally contrained by the control system. Here the motivation
toward real time -feedback is a function of the organization unit security and capability.
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Here the feedback is contaminated by political considerations.
R&D Process
The conduct of Research and Development may be characterized as a purposeful
quest for and application of knowledge. Information is sought and decisions are
made in steps or stages. The information gathering aspects are as important as
decisions and actions leading toward a final product. A given project or task is
typically started with only a general image of the final product.
The decision maker must guide his search for information and gauge choices so
that he learns about appropriate choices as he goes along. At the same time, he must
avoid the risk of commitment to a particular area which will prove to be inappropriate.
Early actions are largely information gathering in nature. These may open
options or opportunities for subsequent choice. These options are finally closed as
progress occurs, directions are set and product choices made. Such closure is a
necessary consequence of bringing the task or project to a successful completion.
The timing of commitment is, however, a variable which may be controlled by the
decision maker.
While the manager's criteria is typically one of efficiency which may seem to
call for early completion to conserve resources, the need for effective results and
broader measures of efficiency may not be served by making early commitments.
Klein, for instance, has argued that in development the most effective policy is one
which considers but avoids early fixed commitments to new and promising areas. The
actions which he recommends be expedited are those required to get prototypes into
tests before decisions are made. He notes that development projects very frequently
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fail to result in the product as planned. Scherer, on the other hand, has pointed out
the problems which have resulted because the deveJopment process is not sufficiently
controlled to insure the desired result.
In still another discussion of the development problem, the present authors
have noted that achieved outcome falls short of the desirable outcomes because
frequently targets are incorrectly set.
The manager who is responsible for conducting development must deal with all
three possibilities.
1. Technological options must be developed and effective
choices from the set of available options chosen.
2. As new options and possibilities are made available
and the implications of previous ones better under-
stood, it will frequently be desirable to redefine the
target. This will require input from development into
the gestalt synthesis process.
3. The development process must be controlled so that
stray value systems, incorrect targets or plain ineffi-
ciency does not result in inappropriate or costly out-
comes.
These three requirements mean that good communication with the gestalt
synthesis process is needed during development.
The development process is not one in which the target is given to a developer
who in turn produces a product. It is one which requires feedback and effective
communication. The limits of effective communication are yet to be defined.
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IV. DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS IN ACTION
The post conference work then has focussed on locating common
dimensions which are useful to distinguish the variety of research situations.
This analysis was accomplished in three steps. Initially the verbatim
transcript was carefully read and then rearranged for each participant. A
"script" was developed that contained every remark made by a participant
with enough other commentary to put the remark into context. Thereby,
nineteen scripts were available for analysis, each script reflecting the
thoughts and questions of a single participant.
The next step in the analysis was based on the following assumptions:
It was assumed that the scripts of each participant,
while not exhaustive, represented his conceptual
model of the R & D process.
Because of the many sources of variation the dimensional differences which
can be discerned may not be directly attributed to any one cause. It is the
strong opinion of the authors from dealing with the data that most of the
differences are reflections of differences in types of organization and industry
rather than individual circumstances.
Given this assumption the scripts were scanned and the statements made
were used to deduce "assertion sets." That is, a set of assumptions about the
R & D process were constructed such that the scripts would appear to be
the logical outcome of a person who held such assumptions. If a participant
held the assumptions deduced then he would have responded as noted in the
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scripts. These assumptions, and assertion sets, wore then used for com-
parison and analysis.
For this analysis the assertion sets of six participants were used.
They were selected to represent a broad cross section of the conference and
to represent a significant portion of the transcript.
The six participants whose assertion sets were separated out and
analyzed are identified by: 1) The type of R & D performed by the organization
they represent (i.e., industrial, governmental, etc.)., and 2) Whether the
R & D is centralized or affiliated with an division. The specific
assertion sets of each participant follow. Pharmaceuticals have been included
as a separate category since they seem to defy direct categorization as either
consumer or industrial.
Participant CA GB GC CD PE CF
Type of R & D (I-Industrial,
C-Consumer, G-Governmental,
P-Pharmaceuticals)
Present R & D organization
(centralized - decentralized)
I&C G G C P C
C C C D C C
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ASSERTION SETS
Participant CA - Industrial Chemical
1. An important expertise of an R & D manager is the ability to reach
decisions on the basis of meager information.
2 . Differences in the expertise of research management explains order of
magnitude differences in the success ratios of research organizations.
For instance, differences of 1/10 to 1/200 in the ratio of successful
products to the total number initiated can be explained by differences
in managerial capability.
3. The R & D organization's only justification (in the long run^ is the
organization's contribution to the introduction of new products or
services.
4. Part of the R & D group's job responsibility is to encourage the
utilization of their own output within the larger organization.
5 . R & D people are often more creative than others in the organization
and have an obligation to extend the horizon or perspective of others
in respect to new product potential of R & D results.
6. To get acceptance and support for an R & D project it is necessary for
the R & D man to go further than to forecast the "key property" that
will be achieved. He must also demonstrate the difference that
property will make. It is the latter step that is the most difficult
to get across.
7. The R & D group seldom gets credit for its contribution to a new
product.
8. The R & D group must collect its own "marketing research" (sense its
own needs). Those in marketing have difficulty in seeing beyond
immediate obstacles.
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Participant GB - Government Laboratory
1. The R & D organization operating in the public sector with no economic
product and no profit and loss statement as a gage faces a much
different decision making environment than the R & D laboratory of a
corporation.
2. Considerations of major importance in closing (or opening) a given
government laboratory are the effect of this action upon:
(a) The balance of R & D capability throughout the
military service involved,
(b) The need to have "in house" capability in those
technical areas which tend to be main stream for
the military service, and
(c) The need to retain high quality R & D personnel
in important areas.
3. It is important to periodically review the justification for an entire
laboratory since there are no built-in review mechanisms. A laboratory
will continue in operation perpetuating its function without change
unless a special review is forced.
4. The interaction of R & D personnel within a university environment is
a very desirable objective. Location of an R & D laboratory with a
university does not guarantee such interchange however.
5. There is a significant risk in allowing the continuity of coverage, in
an important R & D area, to lapse for as little as a year.
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Participant GC - Government Laboratory
The R & D manager should intervene in the normal process when plans
begin to fail.
2 . An R & D manager must accept the overall goals of the organization
as a framework for decisions and not be influenced by his own need
for gratification.
3. Our organization is not concerned with specific R & D products but
rather with the task of advancing science or technology in specific
areas. The output of our laboratory is not the specific product but
an improved capability or reliability of products across a broad field.
4. A long time lag (two to four years) will be involved within an organi-
zation in developing a competence near the "state of the art."
5 . There tend to be long term cyclical fluctuations in centralizing and
decentralizing R & D functions. During some periods they are located
in association with operating elements, (i.e., marketing production,
etc.) and at others they tend to be more autonomous.
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Participant CD - Consumer Product Laboratory
1. The R & D manager's long term success depends upon his success in
sensing the real objectives of other members of management in the
organization. This is very difficult but the R & D manager is in a
position to do so by crystalizing these in terms of an R & D choice
and obtaining a commitment from others.
2 . The R & D group can't live within the larger organization unless the
objectives of all are nearly coincidental. Success in R & D can't
be divorced from success of the total organization.
3. In sensing values of other members of management (not in R & D) there
is often a lag in feedback that influences the prospects for rapid
action.
4. Long term fluctuations in centralizing and decentralizing the research
organizations tend to occur because management "forgets" the dis-
advantages of the strategy not in use.
5 . R & D groups tend to assume the criteria or values of the other
organizational elements with which they are most closely affiliated.
6. Accounting systems cause problems because they emphasize this
year's costs and payoff — an emphasis antithetical to good R & D
decision making.
7. A team or committee, made up of members from different elements of
an organization can be very effective in moving a given R & D product
through to success. The team must be set up early so that all may
feel a party to the changes that will be brought about.
8. The operating divisions ideas about needs and objectives can only be
changed slowly.
9 . R & D decisions must be made in consensus with others in the
corporation outside of R & D.
10. A good manager in R & D will be a good manager in other areas.
Management ability is more important than R & D ability.
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Participant PE - Pharmaceutical Laboratory
1. Profits are important to the achiever in the R & D group because
they measure success for the man who wants feedback on his
performance.
2 . Establishing plans for R & D is part of the corporate goal setting
process and, therefore, cannot provide space. Interpreting corporate
goals for decision making in R & D consequently is not an appropriate
way to characterize the problem.
3. If all the informational sources involved in evaluating new products
are located in R & D then resistance to new product decisions is
largely eliminated. There is no basis for disagreement.
4. R & D decision making is strongly influenced by visibility of the
control system. i,e,.. accounting records. Accounting systems, by
focusing attention on this year's profits, force an inappropriate
de-emphasis from long term R & D decisions.
5. Good researchers want to publish their results to share them with
others.
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Participant CF - Consumer Products Laboratory
1. In the absence of good criteria concerning payoff we supported more
R & D centers than could now be justified.
2 . The payoff afforded by operating an R & D center can be evaluated
(at least subjectively) on the basis of about 10 years of results.
3. Other elements must be convinced of the benefits of any given research
result irrespective of their participation in the setting of R & D
objectives.
4. Other elements of organization must be prepared and kept aware of
product implications from the very early R & D stages.
5. Management's joint utility for risk governs decisions in R & D. The
R & D decisions that are taken on individual products depend upon the
willingness of others in management (outside of R & D) to take risk.
6. An R & D group which is accommodated to the consumer market has
difficulty in obtaining payoff from an industrial market spinoff that
may accrue from R & D.
7. The assessment of an R & D product or outcome, that is made in
undertaking the supporting R & D, is a "subjective commitment" and
is very difficult to transfer to others.
8. Other management functions fail to properly attribute success origins
to the R & D group who initiated a product.
9. R & D project selection cannot be buffered from the effects of the
R & D groups affiliation with other organizational elements.
10. R & D decisions are ultimately based upon consumer need. The path
of relating such an assessment to a product may be diffuse but this is
the true criteria.
11. In supporting university research you have to have a definite beginning
and end to a project understood from the beginning, or you make more
enemies than friends.
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ASSERTATION SETS
A cross comparison of the assertation sets highlight the areas of difference
and the areas of consensus. Differences were found in regard 1) to the
generic nature of R & D; 2) to the question of who establishes criteria and
goals; 3) to the question of criteria for project selection; 4) to the location
of risk; 5) to the sort of information required to justify specific projects
and 6) to the type of expertise required of R & D managers. On the other
hand consensus was found around issues such as the requirement for R & D
group to "sell" their output to the larger institution and. the poor link between
R & D accomplishment and institutional control systems. The differences are
treated first in the paragraphs that follow.
Perception of R & D Management. One difference among the views presented
by those participating concerns the way R & D is considered or envisioned. On
one hand the statements made refer to R & D as a process that can be
objectively characterized and defined; modeled and improved. An alternative
characterization defines R & D as more of an interpersonal and group process.
The way individual participants refer to the R & D process suggest some
fundamental differences among participants in this respect.
This sort of difference is apparent in the transcript but can be demonstrated
by a comparison of the individual assertions which were developed from the
participant's comments. Each assertion in the set offered by an individual
was classified in accordance with the way it referred to R & D.
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The following classifications were used:
i. The statement concerned either a description or recommendation
concerning the role, or behavior, of an individual,
ii. The statement concerned the behavior of groups or organizations
involved in R & D.
iii. The statement concerned objective and non personally oriented
observations about R & D as a process.
The breakdown of assertion sets into these three categories suggests a
major difference among governmental participants and commercial participants
(As a reminder government means in-house government laboratory not a
government contracter.)
Table 2
Participants
(CA,CD PE,CF) (GB&GC)
Assertion Category Commercial Establishments Government Establishments
i (Role Behavior) 10 1
ii (Group Behavior) 12 1
iii (Objective) 11 10
A chi square test shows that at a 5% confidence level, the assertion sets
of government and commercial participants are not drawn from the same population.
This very striking distinction in the conceptual model of R & D seems
related to the distinctions noted in the section below regarding the criteria for
selection of specific projects. It is. a rather puzzling finding and may be
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explainable as a coping mechanism. The government in-house laboratories
engaged in fundamental research, have few objective measures of performance
and they continue to struggle with the objective issues. On the other hand
the development laboratories have an abundance of objective measures,
(though most seem inappropriately short term) and are struggling with behavioral
questions regarding the actualization of these objectives.
Precedence in Establishing R & D Goals and Criteria. A critical point of
difference that emerges concerning R & D goals revolves around the subservience
or the jointness of R & D to the corporate goal setting process. Does the
corporation set goals and then ask the R & D organization to help meet these
goals? Or does the R & D organization and the corporation jointly set goals
in light of the existing technology? Most participants, both government and
commercial, projected an assertion set implying that the R & D goal setting
process is subordinate to the goal setting process of the larger organization.
Assertions GB2, GC2, GDI, CD2, CDS, CD9, CF5, CF9 imply that R & D
decisions are subordinate or at least strongly influenced and constrained by
conditions and preferences previously established in other areas of the organ-
ization. For instance, GC states "An R & D manager must accept the over-
all goals of the organization . . . " CD says, "The R & D manager's long
success depends upon his success in sensing the real objectives of other
members of management in the organization."
Participants CA and PE on the other hand strongly imply, and in the
case of PE directly claim, that the R & D goal setting process is in fact not
subordinate to the process at higher organizational levels.
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"I say if a corporation is going to base its success on research then
research management ought to be a part of corporate management." —"You —
*(participant CD) — were implying that somehow research management was
talking to them instead of being a part of them. "
This observation on the part of participants CA and CD is consistent
with other comments which suggest that the R & D group in CD's organization
has achieved a significant level of formal leadership in respect to the rest
of the organization. The aspect of dominance in goal setting seems to be
symptomatic of an important dimensional difference among R & D organizations
as it should affect risk taking and the inherent probabilities of success .
Criteria for Specific Projects or Programs. As might be inferred from above,
there tends to be a major difference among participants as reflected by
assertion sets, as to whether the criteria for investing in specific R & D
projects should be group oriented or objective and goal oriented. More specifi-
cally on the basis of the assertion sets criteria seemed to fall into three broad
categories.
i. The criteria is definite, concise and product related. —
R & D can only be justified to the extent that it promises
(in the long run) to contribute to specific product lines.
ii. The criteria is a group consensus. — The type of R & D
undertaken must be acceptable to the management group
(within and without R & D). The criteria is the consensus
of management.
iii. The criteria is remote from specific applications. R & D can
be justified on the basis of its contribution in maintaining the
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technoloqlcal competence of the organization in the specific
area at some acceptable level.
Various participants can be segmented in accordance with which of
the three criteria statements noted above they assert as important.
Participant CA strongly asserts criteria i (see CA-3). At the same time the
need to convince the management group, criteria ii, is recognized (CA4 &
CA6). Participant CA is therefore designated i, ii. It should be noted that
the existence of objective criteria make group consensus less important. So
it is internally consistent that participants should tend to recognize either
iii or both i and ii. The criteria emphasized by each participant is listed
in Table 3.
Criteria
i (Specific)
i (Specific)
ii (Consensus)
i (Specific)
ii (Consensus)
ii (Consensus)
i (Specific)
iii (Maintenance
of Competence)
iii (Maintenance
of Competence)
Table 3
Categories of Criteria for Selecting
New Projects
Participant
PE Pharmaceutical
CA Industrial Chemical
CF Consumer Products
CD Consumer Products
GB Government Laboratory
GC Government Laboratory
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There is apparently much heavier reliance upon proxy criteria in justifying
expenditures in Government R & D than in Commercial R & D. As speculation
we might imagine that this is the result of greater decentralization or that
the government is undertaking more fundamental work.
The important point is that there is a difference among participants
as to criteria and this difference is consistent with the differences in other
dimensions of R & D.
Another difference is noted between Pharmaceuticals and other organizations.
Participant PE states that a consensus with a non R & D management group
is unnecessary in gaining support for R & D commitment, while participant CD
considers this consensus critical. The differences are assumed to be. in no
small way, attributable to industry and organization — Pharmaceuticals vs.
a consumer and industrial based R & D organization. In the particular
pharmaceutical corporation discussed all members of the corporation who could
exercise R & D judgment were formally part of the R & D organization.
Here it is interesting to reflect upon the analysis reported above. The
government laboratory executives tended to talk objectively about R & D process
rather than about motivating and directing the researchers. This seems to
coincide with the relative lack of specificity exhibited in their goal structures.
The commercial laboratories' concern for specific product related outcomes seem
to require more emphasis upon personal control than upon general process control
Individual versus Group Utility for Risk. A fourth area in which there is a
consistent difference among participants arises concerning group versus
individual assumption of risk. Decision theorists have noted that groups
differ from individuals in their propensity to assume risk, with groups tending
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to assume greater risk. This in turn will have implication for the organization
propensity for risk in undertaking R & D projects. As foreshadowed by the
different criteria for R & D investments, significant differences are apparent
in risk sharing — whether the risk of a typical R & D activity is shared
broadly or assumed within the R & D group.
Participants GB, PE, and CA (and GC tentatively) imply narrow risk
assumption, that the R & D group itself must assume the risk inherent in
a new undertaking (see assertions CAS, GC3, and the transcript for GB and
PE). On the other had CD and CF clearly state that an R & D manager
cannot make commitment decisions in a vacuum. It is the willingness of
the larger management group to share the risk of a new area or project that
enables a go ahead (see assertions GDI, CD2, CDS, and CF5).
The way that organizations configure themselves to accept the risk of
project development will influence the profile of investment in R & D. The
writers consider this to be an important dimensional difference the way
organizations carry out R & D.
Informational Analysis for R & D Decision. Some difference of opinion was
apparent concerning appropriate sources of information about new directions for
R & D. Several participants held that market and market research information
from the marketing area of the organization could be relied upon to point out
new directions. Other participants held strongly that marketing was unsuited
to this task due to their short time perspective. Views concerning the proper
role of marketing information lay along a spectrum from complete distrust of the
marketing groups ability (this had little meaning to government participants GB
& GC) to an acknowledgement that the marketing group does point the way
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tended to be very influential in R & D groups closely associated with
marketing organizations. This sort of distinction is of considerable
importance in terms of organizational structure.
Specialization of Management. The final aspect noted here, along which
difference of opinion arose, concerned the appropriate capability of management,
Several participants expressed the opinion that the individual who is a good
manager is a good manager in R & D as well as other areas. The trait of
managerial ability was considered more important than specialized ability in
the R & D area.
On the other hand, other participants stressed the unique and necessarily
special capabilities of those who perform well in R & D areas. The strong
implication from the latter category is that special abilities are required in
managing R & D.
The most outspoken advocate of special ability was participant CA who
claimed important expertise for the effective technologist and decision maker
(assertions CA1 and 5). On the other hand participant CD asserted a common
management skill that was of great importance to all managers (CD-10). The
other participants seemed to lie along the polar extremes established by
CA and CD.
Areas of Consensus. The group seemed to agree in several respects. These
areas concerned 1) the R & D groups obligation to advocate and promote
the product yielded by the organization itself, 2) the fact that the R & D
group perform their valuable services at the beginning of the long chain of new
product introduction leads to a condition where they received improper credit
for their achievement, 3) accounting practices and other annual management
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control systems tend to lead to inappropriate decisions in the R & D area
since they are both highly visible and completely myopic in automatically
emphasizing immediate return to the detriment of long run payoff, 4) there
tend to be long term "fad" cyclical fluctuations in the way R & D groups
are organized, managed and associated within the larger organization.
These result because 1) there is no explicit criteria that can be immediately
assessed and 2) management tends to forget what was wrong with previous
approaches. Organizations therefore oscillate between organizational modes
with a very slow frequency of oscillation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A summary of the issues raised in the abstract, in the "speculative
framework, " and in the analysis of assertion sets shows major disparity in
respect to the important dimensions of research and development. The
"speculative framework" identifies critical dimensions unique to project
management, while the results from the Workshop discussions reflect dimensions
relating to laboratory management.
For instance, in the Workshop sessions much concern was voiced about
the match between research objectives and organizational objectives. This was
evidenced in the discussion regarding the role of the research director - is he
a top manager creating policy or a second level manager executing policy?
Should research objectives be set by the parent organization, or should they be
set by the research group within general guidelines of the parent organization
or should they be set jointly? Clearly, such an issue is important, but
not so centrally in the process of project management as in the process of
laboratory management.
In retrospect, the disparity between the concerns of managers in the
two situations was extremely apparent in the tensions of the workshop itself.
Since the focus of the authors was on research project management they
attempted to get "seasoned" research managers as workshop participants.
This emphasis on seasoning led to a set of participants who were so seasoned
that they had become laboratory managers. Then the use of an open structure
to the discussions allowed the participants to continue to shift toward
-A
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laboratory management issues. Thus, the post Workshop analysis showed
interesting results mainly on issues of central concern to laboratory management,
The scope of this shift can be best shown by summarizing the issues
dealt with in the conference. These critical issues included:
1. How to relate research to the objectives of the parent
organization ?
2 . What essential steps were required of the research
organization to follow innovation past the laboratory and
into production, marketing and commercialization so as
to assure effective outcomes and due realization of the
R & D product?
3. What are the different types of value that arise from
individual projects (be they successes or failures) in
regard to later projects and how can the laboratory organ-
ization improve this transfer?
4. What actions are essential to maintain the creativity
and effectiveness of R & D groups within the larger
organizational setting?
5. How does the relative clarity of objectives influence
performance ?
6. What is the effect of organizational reward and control
systems which are normally short term upon the performance
of R & D groups which have inherent long term time horizons.
The fundamental differences in the "areas of concern" in project and
laboratory management settings suggest that this dichotimization is itself
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an important situational partition. In many circumstances it may be
sufficient to distinguish which situation you are using as your unit of
analysis and explore the dimensions of importance within the unit rather
than to develop a complete set of dimensions applicable to either. Thus,
as the authors pursue further studies of laboratory and/or project manage-
ment they will be forced to carefully consider whether there is a major
interaction between the two levels in the problem area of interest or whether
the interactions can be ignored for the problem at hand.
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